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In The Regulatory Enterprise, Tony Prosser proposes two regulatory visions at once in dialogue and polar opposition, as well as acknowledging a degree of hybridity constituting regulatory environments 
and spaces of control, something which influential 
voices in technology regulation, namely Lawrence 
Lessig, have been accused of underplaying in order 
to assert the argument ‘that there is considerable 
novelty to the nature of law in Cyberspace’1. There 
is a ‘major distinction’, claims Prosser, ‘between 
regulation as infringement of private autonomy and 
regulation as a collaborative enterprise’, and this, I 
suggest, is applicable to the blockchain regulatory 
conundrum2. For present purposes, the former, an 
emphasis on autonomy, can be said to accord with 
a vision of blockchain put forward by the ecosystem 
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based on neoliberal market-complementing regula-
tion, economic efficiency, and self-interest, and what 
Prosser further refers to as “regulation for economic 
efficiency and consumer choice.”3
In his discussion of liberty and trust within a (neo)
liberal moral and legal framework, Joseph Raz defines 
autonomy or the “capacity for valuable autonomous 
life” as a “double-side duty” (or what might otherwise 
be deemed a deliberate contradiction) requiring “gov-
ernment to stand back and let people have the choice 
as to how to conduct their own lives,” but equally gov-
ernment taking “active steps, where needed, to ensure 
that people enjoy the basic capacities (physical and 
mental) and have the resources to avail themselves of 
an adequate range of options available in their soci-
ety.”4 On the other hand, the latter, regulation as a 
collaborative enterprise, enables political, social, or 
distributive feasibility, community, and generosity, or 
what Prosser aligns to “regulation for social solidarity” 
and “regulation as deliberation.”5 A fourth regulatory 
framework highlight by Prosser concerns the protec-
tion of rights6; regulation rooted in domestic and 
trans-national legislative frameworks, as well as inter-
national law and treaties, which do not necessarily 
favour either the polarity of markets and self-interest 
or community and generosity unless predisposed to do 
so by law.
Cutting across each of the positivist regulatory 
frameworks, however, is a natural law tradition and 
a potential for equity that aims at mollifying the 
harder edges of the regulatory enterprise and arguably 
underscoring the deliberative conditions that Prosser 
touches on. It is here that we can locate “the good” in 
relation to blockchain, although it is important, not 
least given regulatory uncertainty that is central to 
the blockchain regulatory conundrum, to understand 
the role the good plays when applied to the regula-
tion of blockchain, rather than simply notions of the 
good free-flowing from the blockchain ecosystem as a 
product of particular techno-economic concepts and 
use-cases—a notion of the good that arguably accords 
with “an empty space into which human choice may 
move.”7 Notions of the good drawn from inter alia 
Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes are instructive here, as 
is, with particular regard to Prosser’s fourth regula-
tory framework, translation of the good as a moral 
determination of justice to a regime of enforceable 
(contractual) rights. In the background, however, it 
is important to remember the problems created by 
attempting to pin-down the good. As Iris Murdoch 
maintains, the concept of the good “remains obscure 
and mysterious,” and we all “see the world in the light 
of the Good, but what,” she asks, “is the Good itself?”8
Although Plato and Aristotle rejected the good 
as rooted in subjectivism, both maintain the import 
of human nature in defining what goods are or ought 
to be. For Plato the role of human nature “is not to 
define or set the good, but merely to define what the 
possibilities of human achievement are.”9 Similarly, 
Aristotle holds that, “what makes it true that some-
thing is good is not that it stands in some relation to 
desire but rather that it is somehow perfective or com-
pleting of a being, where what is perfective of com-
pleting of a being depends on the being’s nature.”10 
In contrast, Hobbes forefronts desire in determina-
tions of the good, and it is this form that arguably best 
describes regulatory processes such as self-regulation. 
Subjectivist theories of the good makes true what is 
good as that which is desired or liked, and thus the 
good for Hobbes always returns to notions of self-
preservation which manifest clearly in, for example, 
efforts to forestall legislation that restricts the global 
investment practices of technology titans like Google, 
and lead them instead to enter into self-regulation 
pacts in order to retain control within the limits of 
self-interest.11
Also, brief mention of the shift from good to right 
is important here because it is fundamentally a contin-
uation of an enlightenment colonization of economic 
rationality over all social life, whereby contract is 
the ultimate arbiter of human interrelatedness negat-
ing the need for honesty or trust to flourish outside 
of contractual domains and agreements. Conditions, 
moreover, which are further reinforced by a suite of 
contractual remedies that insist on performance as 
well as compensation and damages. Equity as body 
of law, in this sense, arguably preserves contractual 
domains while countermanding the resilience of non-
contractual social relations and status. The impor-
tance of contract in the blockchain context cannot be 
overstated, not least because of the importance placed 
on the burgeoning field of so-called smart contracts 
(as well as “secret contracts”) as a new and potentially 
global modern contractual regime-in-waiting. Smart 
contracts are certainly not capable of supplanting 
The Control by and Rights 
from page 1
A u g u s t  2 0 1 8  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N E T  L A W
9
contract law as we presently find it, but the hope of 
many stakeholders is that it soon will.
Melanie Swan, for instance, addresses the mat-
ter via a typical problem/solution matrix. “Contracts 
do not make anything possible that was previously 
impossible,” she claims, “rather, they allow common 
problems to be solved in a way that minimizes the 
need for trust. Minimal trust often makes things more 
convenient by taking human judgement out of the 
equation, thus allowing complete automation.”12 For 
Swan, therefore, the journey from an ethics rooted in 
human discretion (morality, equity, natural law, and 
so on), to enlightenment social rationalisation in the 
form of contract is perfected by blockchain, to recall 
the Aristotelian notion of the good, and the opportu-
nity for full automation of contractual agreements and 
the rendering autonomous of all forms of human inter-
relatedness over which contract has long principally 
held sway. And recalling Hobbes, Swan also suggests 
that “smart contracts impact not just contract law, but 
more broadly the notion of the social contract within 
society.”13
It is important to note that what Swan and oth-
ers in the blockchain ecosystem are proposing is not 
so much radical due to novelty—contract long ago 
shifted the texture of social interactions and as an 
offline and off-chain technology has been supremely 
successful, perhaps more so than blockchain and 
smart contracts are ever likely to be. Instead, radical-
ism is to be found in the apparent attempt within the 
blockchain ecosystem to forge a linkage between a 
metaphysic of “the good” and the instrumental per-
formativity inherent to contractual status. Moreover, 
that this connection should be made by machines 
and software automatically and autonomously rather 
than as a precondition of human needs, rights and 
desires, thus skewing and intertwining the logic of 
“the good” and contract. “A technological innova-
tion may know long periods of stagnation or regres-
sion,” Félix Guattari argues, “but there are few cases 
in which it does not ‘restart’ at a later date.”14 The 
suggestion here is not that the technology or mode 
of legal technique of contract has not been anything 
but alarmingly present throughout modernity. What 
has amounted and continues to amount to the good, 
in comparison, is more contentious. Yet smart con-
tracts may well indicate a restart of contract and espe-
cially in the performativity of contracting, as implied 
by Guattari, through (re)alignment with ‘the good’, 
although the consequences of this remain unknown 
and potentially hard to determine.
The current task of understanding what regulating 
blockchain means or ought to mean is occurring against 
a backdrop of continuing struggles to achieve stable 
regulation and governance of commercial platforms, 
within networks, and in consideration of interoper-
ability and the broader architecture of the Internet. 
Few, it might be said, would argue that Internet regu-
lations have succeeded in producing universally held 
“good” behaviour or conduct. The questions, prob-
lems, and so on that blockchain brings to the fore are 
not easily abstracted from concerns that continue to 
plague regulation of Internet-based networks and sys-
tems, and from the perspective of capital these con-
cerns often coagulate around perceived and actual 
systemic inefficiencies that technologies bring to bear.
There is a phylogenetic evolution of network 
technologies, in which blockchain can be included, 
exposed to formal and informal (customary) stan-
dards and benchmarks for improving efficiency gains 
in business (and beyond), with any subsequent deter-
minations of effectiveness those technologies herald 
linked directly and primarily to net gains in economic 
efficiency. This emphasis on efficiency is arguably a 
product of neoliberalism generally, although Michael 
Power attributes it more specifically to the audit 
culture that has matured during the last 40 years of 
neoliberalism. “At the level of these technologies,” 
claims Power, “practitioners constantly debate the 
efficiency of different methods and seek to elaborate 
cost-efficient solutions to the problem of providing 
assurance.”15 “Accordingly,” he concludes “even audit 
techniques are surrounded by sub-programmes and 
meta-discourses about their potential. Technical prac-
tice cannot be disentangled form the stories which are told 
of its capability and possibility” [emphasis added].16
Further, as Brownsword argues: “one of the facts 
of regulatory life is that there is no easy way out of 
deep moral disagreement. It is a problem that has 
taxed moral and political philosophers; and it is a 
problem that will continue to plague the regulation of 
new technologies.”17 Shortcomings in Internet regula-
tion remain stubbornly apparent some 30 years into 
the mass adoption of the technology.18 The how’s and 
why’s of blockchain regulation now form part of, but 
have also arguably intensified, the broader regulatory 
conundrum started by the Internet. There are a num-
ber of reasons for this claim. Of most interest here, 
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however, is one that concerns the co-evolution of 
technology and economy and, importantly, associated 
cultural and political ramifications, and how regula-
tory environments, enterprise and rationale address 
them. If, for example, it is true that the “economy 
is an expression of its technologies,” it is equally so, 
I claim, that technologies are the expression of eco-
nomic will, and the present blockchain moment is 
both illustrative and symptomatic of the latter, rather 
than the former.19
DISRUPTING REGULATION
The emergence of so-called blockchain “disrup-
tion” within the contemporary political and economic 
moment calls to mind Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of 
creative destruction.20 In the hands of quasi-libertarian, 
self-interested and what Vinay Gupta has called, “cha-
otic” entrepreneurs, this creative destruction has led, in 
the main, to myriad attempts at re-imagining (not dis-
rupting) legacy financial systems over the last decade 
using cryptocurrencies within the scope of capitalism.21 
The desire now is to repeat the process in an array of 
noncurrency based, normatively civic arenas such as 
e-voting, land registries, and health records.22 In prac-
tice, this means growth in blockchain-based private-
public partnerships, or to put it another way an upsurge 
in tendering for privatization of forms of public adminis-
tration that will put many more future data controllers 
beyond direct political accountability (private corpo-
rate actors not being publicly elected officials).
So-called blockchain 2.0 and 3.0 projects are thus 
following a model of evolving capital-led projects: 
from those of a classical liberal economic age in which 
capital was front and centre in all modes of business, 
commerce and industry, to the more ambiguous and 
obscure role capital now plays in the strategies of mis-
direction and sleights of hand of neoliberalism. Amid 
shifts in economic/regulatory models the role of regu-
lators has been amplified by the perverse matrix of 
behaviours and attitudes these technologies have cre-
ated and continue to create. Regulation is, however, 
also being denied, resisted, and sent into retreat based 
on the idea that centralized government authorities 
and regulators are ill-equipped and ill-prepared for the 
task of dealing with technology or high levels of chaos 
and white-noise emanating from the blockchain 
ecosystem.
The so-called wait and see or the somewhat more 
proactive ‘wait and monitor” approaches to regulation 
adopted by the likes of the European Commission are 
symptomatic not of a reasonable approach to block-
chain, but, I argue, of an unwillingness by govern-
ments to muster the energy, let alone the resources, 
to challenge private self-interest.23 “Drawing up regu-
lations for blockchain at this early stage would be a 
mistake,” argued The Economist in 2015, “the history 
of peer-to-peer technology suggests that it is likely to 
be several years before the technology’s full potential 
becomes clear. In the meantime regulators should 
stay their hands, or find ways to accommodate new 
approaches within existing frameworks, rather than 
risk stifling a fast-evolving idea with overly prescrip-
tive rules.”24 Narratives of regulatory weakness such as 
the one presented by The Economist and disseminated 
by technology ecosystems like that of blockchain 
are being accepted by governments and regulators 
as fundamental truths. Further, practices of rhetoric 
and persuasion have enabled competition and mar-
kets to intercede and translate regulatory frameworks 
and techniques in their own image. Standardization, 
for example, whilst considered contra the interests of 
devotees of free markets who “characterize regulation 
as simply an unnecessary cost to business,” is never-
theless only good at the end of the day for delivering 
economies of scale that will be of benefit to ever larger 
markets.25
Again there is nothing new about any of this. 
What is happening around blockchain is merely a 
continuation of regulatory trends that have remained 
constant for at least 40 years, accept, perhaps, during 
the collapse of public confidence wrought by the 2008 
financial crisis which forced governments to change 
tack from fewer to more (apparent) regulations.26 In 
the context of technology, the change in regulatory 
bias notably occurred within financial services and 
created the outgrowth of FinTech (financial technol-
ogies) and RegTech (regulatory technologies), respec-
tively. However, this resulted in greater commitments 
by governments to innovationist narratives and work-
ing with a reserve army of entrepreneurs prepared to 
play in “sandboxes.” This sandbox culture as the sine 
qua non of contemporary regulatory standoffishness at 
the state level has ultimately spawned the problem-
atic regulatory conundrum with which we are now 
faced, one in which innovationism and solutionism 
have been legitimized.
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Attempts by entrepreneurs to leverage personal, 
self-interested gains through the re-imaging of vari-
ous legacy systems, are occurring at the fuzzy edges of 
transnational regulatory understanding and leading 
to the threat of regulatory disorientation, whereby 
focus is stuck on “centralized actors in a decentralized 
ecosystem” and, therefore, “will not be able to keep 
pace.”27 Jurisdictions have as a consequence reacted at 
different speeds, some slow, others with more urgency, 
especially in the case of cryptocurrency regulation, 
which has included in some cases outright bans on 
the trading and possibly also on the use of cryptocur-
rency.28 Nevertheless, as yet the majority of jurisdic-
tions have said little and done less to define or impose 
limits on blockchain specifically, nor on its ecosystem 
or the conduct produced by it. This “wait and see” 
approach, it would appear, is a longer term project, a 
fact that is only welcome if that means serious criti-
cal scrutiny of the technology is undertaken in the 
meantime.29
Where it is problem, however, is twofold: firstly, 
where the wait and see policy is beholden to forms of 
innovationism or creates a vacuum that innovation-
ism quickly fills; something often made clear by calls 
from entrepreneurs and other stakeholders for govern-
ment not to stifle innovation30; secondly, in allowing 
a lag between law, regulation, and governance and 
blockchain to grow in the interim. Both problems, 
which largely intersect, repeat the shortcomings and 
mistakes of Internet regulation which have led to the 
explicit dominance of big data business and the mass 
commercialization of cyberspace on the one hand, and 
a parallel ungovernable ‘dark-net’ on the other hand. 
Whether the problem is seen as central (legitimate 
and notionally legal big data business) or peripheral 
(dark web as shadow or black markets), there is a clear 
shared dialogue between the innovative capabilities 
of the technologies in use.
Ironically, if we follow Ilkka Tuomi’s definition 
of innovation as relating to technologies that lead to 
tangible change in social practices, it is more likely 
than not that the peripheral uses innovate first and 
further.31 Milton Mueller reinforces this point, whilst 
also simultaneously celebrating innovation and 
highlighting failures in Internet regulation and gov-
ernance. “It has become a cliché,” says Mueller, “to 
note that the ‘unified and unfragmented space’ cre-
ated by the victory of the Internet protocols was filled 
not only with innovative economic and social activity, 
but also with the crimes and conflicts that accompany 
human interactions in every other space” [emphasis 
added].32 Thus, Mueller concludes, “[a]long with the 
innovations, efficiencies, and creative new forms of 
entertainment and interaction came thieves, bullies, 
fraudsters, child abusers, spies, vandals.”33
Although blockchain may not be considered a par-
ticularly risky technology in terms of potential threats 
or harms, it poses to individuals or communities— 
compare this with, for example, cautionary tales sur-
rounding “the malign aspect of technology” that 
includes perceived threats from bioengineering, arti-
ficial intelligence, and nanotechnologies—this does 
not mean that no threats or harms exist. Instead, these 
manifest in other, more subtle ways.34 There are, for 
instance, conceivable threats and harms posed by the 
blockchain ecosystem in further entrenching and dis-
seminating neoliberal ideology. For neoliberal stake-
holders and those complaisant about the ill-effects of 
social and political control wrought by “free-market” 
economics, this is unlikely to sound like a threat at 
all. For this class of stakeholder blockchain remains, 
for the better, “an institutional technology to decen-
tralize the governance structures used to coordinate 
people and economic decision making.”35 If, however, 
neoliberal ideology is grounded in what Stuart Hall 
called the anachronism of “the free, possessive indi-
vidual, with state cast as tyrannical and oppressive,” 
whereby the state “must not intervene in the ‘natural’ 
mechanisms of the free market, or take as its objective 
the amelioration of free-market capitalism’s propen-
sity to create inequality,” then what is at stake in the 
regulatory decisions that foster or mitigate more neo-
liberalism in the blockchain context ought to be clear, 
questioned and ultimately challenged, because they do 
represent threats and the potential for harm.36 G.A. 
Cohen is less forgiving than Hall in the language he 
chooses to criticise markets, but the conclusions the 
two reach are nevertheless in accord:
The immediate motive to productive activity 
in a market society is typically some mixture 
of greed and fear, in proportions that vary with 
the details of a person’s market position and 
personal character. In greed, other people are 
seen as possible sources of enrichment, and in 
fear they are seen as threats. These are hor-
rible ways of seeing other people, however 
much we have become habituated and inured 
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to them, as a result of centuries of capitalist 
development.37
Cohen is robust in his critique of free-market 
ideology, and although he also deals at length with 
the more germane issue of regulation in his criticism 
of John Rawls, it is his “antimarket” discourse that 
provides a vocabulary for tackling the blockchain 
regulatory conundrum as it is understood here, and in 
particular to feed the double meaning of disrupting reg-
ulation, as the ability of regulation to disrupt, as well 
as be disrupted. It offers, therefore, a principled basis 
for thinking about blockchain regulation not from 
the point of view of neoliberal free-market ideology, 
a position Cohen claims is motivated by “greed and 
fear,” but from commitments to “fellow human beings 
and with a desire to serve them while being served by 
them.”38 Cohen continues:
I mean, here, by ‘community’, the antimarket 
principle according to which I serve you not 
because of what I can get out of doing so but 
because you need my service. That is antimar-
ket because the market motivates productive 
contribution not on the basis of commitment 
to one’s fellow human beings and a desire to 
serve them while being served by them, but 
on the basis of impersonal cash reward […] 
The genius of the market is that it recruits 
shabby motives to desirable ends, and, in a 
balanced view, both sides of that proposition 
must be kept in focus. Generosity and self-
interest exist in everyone. We know how to 
make an economic system work on the basis of 
self-interest. We do not know how to make it 
work on the basis of generosity. But that does 
not mean that we should forget generosity: we 
should still confine the sway of self-interest as 
much as we can.39
Cohen’s call “to confine the sway of self-inter-
est” resonates closely with the regulatory enterprise 
required in the blockchain context, but also more 
generally as well. Finally, regulating blockchain as it 
is defined here asks whether blockchain is a neces-
sary technology in a given context versus alternative 
technologies or even, perhaps, whether the option of 
no technology at all is or might be the most appropri-
ate response. This approach asks the question of why 
nobody has found a use for blockchain in the 10 years 
of its existence.40 Moreover, it echoes a pragmatic 
turn by the United States Bureau of the Fiscal Service 
(BFS) toward evaluations of blockchain use and rel-
evance in a given context. For example, on the BFS 
website under the heading “Determine if Blockchain 
is a Good fit” is the following framework:
To help you determine if blockchain is a 
potential solution, you can apply criteria to 
your use case. If you answer “yes” to several of 
these questions, a blockchain solution may be 
worth considering:
• Do you need a structured central repository of 
information?
• Is more than one entity reading or writing trans-
actions to a database?
• Is there less than total trust between parties/enti-
ties in the ecosystem? (for example, one user will 
not accept the “truth” as reported by another 
user)
• Are central gatekeepers introducing costs and /or 
“friction” when verifying transactions (for exam-
ple, manual verification)?
• Are there routine or logical interactions that 
occur that could be programmed to self-execute 
(for example, smart contracts)?41
GDPR VS BLOCKCHAIN
A notable manifestation of the blockchain 
regulatory conundrum involves the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) introduced by the 
European Union (EU) in May 2018 to replace the 
1995 Data Protection Directive. The regulation rep-
resents an extraordinary and, in some cases, unwel-
come new reality in the blockchain ecosystem as a 
continuation of the European Union’s “particularly 
strong constitutional tradition of privacy protection” 
and development of EU data protection law.42 What 
is more, GDPR actually performs a number of func-
tions that data sovereignty models on blockchain 
perform, most notably in terms of giving back con-
trol of personal data to data subjects, thereby argu-
ably undermining many blockchain business models.43 
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The EU’s influence in this regard extends far beyond 
the boundaries of the Union, which thus implies a 
far-reaching impact of the GDPR for blockchain use-
cases that do not specifically, intentionally, or directly 
involve personal data of EU citizens. “The EU has 
successfully influenced other regional privacy laws by 
restricting the transfer of personal data from member 
states to countries without adequate privacy protec-
tion,” Brown and Marsden point out, and this “deter-
mination of ‘adequacy’ overseen by the European 
Commission, in practice requires other states to 
introduce most of the key protections [from EU data 
protection directives and regulations] into their own 
national laws.”44
It is important, albeit briefly, to note GDPR here 
even though potential impacts remain speculative at 
the time of writing, because the regulation is likely 
to affect a wide range of blockchain use-cases in the 
EU and beyond. Key questions for the GDPR versus 
blockchain debate begin with the matter of control of 
personal data, specifically who within the context of 
a blockchain application is controlling data and thus 
accountable for its administration within the scope of 
the regulation. As Jacek Czarnecki maintains: “The 
controller determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data. Does such an entity exist 
at all in the context of a distributed blockchain? We 
can potentially treat transaction-confirming miners 
as controllers (in the case of the proof-of-work con-
sensus)—something that in the case of large public 
blockchains will be unfeasible in practice.”45 Control 
equally concerns jurisdiction, in terms of the juris-
diction in which a data controlling party (block-
chain node or miner for example) is located and thus 
the possible or extent of the laws governing them. 
Winston Maxwell and John Salmon also point to the 
impact upon issues of control wrought by the different 
varieties of blockchain, namely permissioned, permis-
sionless, and so on.46
The impact of the GDPR on use-cases flowing 
from the blockchain ecosystem is certainly not negli-
gible, and impact assessments will likely be necessary 
for use-cases relating to permissionless, public block-
chains, as well as those for civic service management 
of sensitive data such as health records.47 The necessity 
of impact assessments for private or enterprise block-
chain is less clear however, as Andries Van Humbeeck 
maintains: “An important aspect of GDPR on block-
chain is the fact that personal data is not to leave the 
EU. This is a major problem with public blockchains, 
since there is no control on who hosts a node. This is 
less an issue when it comes to private or permissioned 
blockchains.”48 In this sense, the GDPR is arguably 
already performing a broad-ranging ex ante regulatory 
function that some blockchain stakeholders will view 
as counterproductive to innovation.
Rights for “data subjects” under GDPR include: 
access to personal data and supplementary informa-
tion, which involves submission of a subject access 
request (SAR); objections to certain forms of pro-
cessing including direct marketing and for research 
and statistics; rectification of inaccurate and incom-
plete personal data; erasure of personal data, oth-
erwise known as “the right to be forgotten”; the 
restriction of processing of personal data; rights 
relating to profiling and automated decision-mak-
ing, a right that could impinge upon the “invisible” 
machine-to-machine capabilities that blockchain is 
able to facilitate via smart contracts; and claims for 
compensation for damage caused by a data breach. 
Further, limitations on transferring data and infor-
mation outside of the European Union other than 
for prescribed reasons, places restrictions on the 
free-flow across geographical and jurisdictional 
space. Many of the rights and restrictions the GDPR 
introduces contradict the ways in which existing 
global computer network operate, and this includes 
blockchain.
Of the new rights, the right to be forgotten (Art. 
17) is one which does not sit comfortably with what 
for many stakeholders are core and desirable features 
of blockchain, namely the ability of “immutability” 
to create “transparency” in order to foster “trust.” It 
is important to note that “erasure” is not an absolute 
right to be forgotten under the terms of the legislation 
however, and if, for example, the data involve defence 
of a legal claim or have overriding public interest, 
then a data controller can refuse to comply with the 
right. “The goal of GPDR is to ‘give citizens back the 
control of their personal data, whilst imposing strict 
rules on those hosting and ‘processing’ this data, any-
where in the world,” says Van Humbeeck, and “one of 
the things GDPR states is that data ‘should be eras-
able.’ Since throwing away your encryption keys is not 
the same as ‘erasure of data’, GDPR prohibits us from 
storing personal data on a blockchain level. Thereby 
losing the ability to enhance control of your own per-
sonal data.”49 For Van Humbeeck, this is the paradox 
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of GDPR and blockchain. Maxwell and Salmon 
describe the issue further:
One of the design features of blockchain 
architecture is that transaction records can-
not be changed or deleted after-the-fact. A 
subsequent transaction can always annul the 
first transaction, but the first transaction will 
remain in the chain. The GDPR recognises a 
right to erasure. The broad principle under-
pinning this right is to enable an individual 
to request the deletion or removal of personal 
data where there is no compelling reason for 
its continued processing. What constitutes 
“erasure” is still open to debate. Some data 
protection authorities have found that irre-
versible encryption constitutes erasure. In a 
blockchain environment, erasure is techni-
cally impossible because the system is designed 
to prevent it.50
The right to be forgotten linked to the erasure of 
personal data thus strike at the heart of the immuta-
bility of blockchain. Following the logic above, once 
immutability is brought into question or falls com-
pletely through general implementation of mecha-
nisms for undoing chains, this brings into question 
both the creation of transparency and the ability to 
foster trust. And, some will argue, without the abil-
ity to foster trust or at least to do so without the evil 
necessity of having to rely on institutional middle-
men like banks or government, what is the point of 
blockchain?
For use-cases to remain viable an industry in 
workarounds that exploit cracks in the detail of the 
GDPR have been in business since the reality of what 
GDPR would entail began to emerge in the block-
chain ecosystem in early 2017. “Smart contracts will 
contain mechanisms governing access rights,” claim 
Maxwell and Salmon, “therefore the smart contract 
can be used to revoke all access rights, thereby making 
the content invisible to others, albeit not erased.”51 
Meanwhile, “a popular option to get around this prob-
lem is a very simple one,” says Van Humbeeck, “you 
store the personal data off-chain and store the refer-
ence to this data, along with a hash of this data and 
other metadata (like claims and permissions about 
this data), on the blockchain.”52 On the other hand, 
as Van Humbeeck also admits, the term “workaround” 
is a clear acknowledgement of the regrettable positon 
the GDPR puts the ecosystem in, and that “compro-
mise is rarely good for business.”53 This is an illustra-
tion of the point that classic regulatory conundrums 
turn on the extent to which regulatees are compliant 
or can made to be compliant in the future. As Stuart 
Biegel maintained with regard to the Internet but in 
terms arguably appropriate for the present discussion:
Under current conditions, given the highly 
participatory nature of online activity and 
the distributed, anarchic design of cyberspace 
itself, there are a host of ways to get around 
most restrictions that may be imposed. In 
addition, new architectural changes can often 
be countered by other code-based solutions. 
Thus a proposed regulatory approach may not 
be possible unless those that have the ability 
to resist agree to go along with the plan.54
At the time of writing the ramifications of the 
GDPR versus blockchain debate remain inconclu-
sive. What is obvious already, however, is a desire for 
blockchain stakeholders to exploit, as best they can, 
uncertainties existing within the four corners of the 
GDPR using know-how or as Biegel suggests “the abil-
ity to resist.” Thus while the regulation is forcing com-
pliance to some extent, it is by no means watertight 
and concerns for regulators ought to surround greater 
desires to undermine the regulations rather than com-
ply with them. Test cases in the coming months and 
years will be necessary for the further interpretation of 
the regulation and these are guaranteed to emerge as 
stakeholders push blockchain concepts and use-cases 
to the limits of compliance. Quite what “compliance” 
means in terms of blockchain is, of course, itself yet to 
be meaningfully or authoritatively defined by regula-
tors or the wider legal community.
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